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Abstract—Locational marginal pricing (LMP) is a widely
employed method for pricing electricity in the wholesale
electricity market. Although it is well known that the LMP
mechanism is vulnerable to market manipulation, there
is little literature providing a systematic analysis of this
phenomenon. In the first part of this paper, we investigate
the economic dispatch outcomes of the LMP mechanism
with strategic agents. We show via counterexamples, that
contrary to popular belief, a Nash equilibrium may not
exist. And when it exists, the price of anarchy may be
arbitrarily large. We then provide two sufficient conditions
under either of which an efficient Nash equilibria exists.
Last, we propose a new market mechanism for electricity
markets, the Power Network Second Price (PNSP) mech-
anism that always induces an efficient Nash equilibrium.
We briefly address the extensions on the demand side.
Index Terms—Electricity market, game theory, locational
marginal pricing, mechanism design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electric power is traded in wholesale electricity mar-
kets that involve various entities: the generators who gen-
erate and sell power, the distributors who buy power and
sell to consumers, and the Independent System Operator
(ISO). The ISO’s role is to act as a dispatcher and a
market-maker. The ISO asks for economic signals from
the generators and the distributors and then determines
a generation and dispatch schedule, as well as the nodal
prices. The surplus is distributed among the Transmis-
sion System Operators (TSOs) to compensate them for
use of the transmission infrastructure. This problem is
commonly called the economic dispatch problem.
Indeed, the participants are economic agents each with
their own objectives and some private information as
well. Hence, they would be expected to behave in a
way to further their own interests, or in other words,
act strategically, and even give misleading information
if it benefits them. However, in the design and analysis
of mechanisms for economic dispatch, it is assumed
that both generators and distributors truthfully reveal
their marginal costs, marginal utilities, etc. Thus, an
optimization problem is formulated whose solution then
gives the optimal dispatch schedule.
In this paper, we start with the premise that the market
participants, i.e., the generators and the distributors are
self-interested and strategic economic agents, and despite
the regulation they are subjected to, they can and will
find ways to manipulate the market. This is not far-
fetched since Enron energy traders indeed found ways
to manipulate the congestion prices that led to the
California electricity crisis of 2000–01 [1], [2]. Our goal
is to understand what happens to market efficiency when
there is strategic behavior, and the resulting outcomes.
Locational marginal pricing (LMP), also known as
nodal pricing, is a method for pricing electricity in the
wholesale market [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. The locational
marginal price (LMP) at a node is the cost of supplying
the next increment of load at that node, taking into
account transmission losses and congestion. Typically,
it is the shadow price for the power balance constraint
in the economic dispatch optimization problem. The
mechanism is widely used in the US, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand.
The LMP mechanism has been studied extensively
but primarily in a competitive market setting where the
market participants are assumed to be truthful about
their cost and demand functions, and no one exercises
market power [8]. In practice though, exercise of market
power is observed often, and there is no reason to believe
that the revealed generation marginal costs are exactly
truthful. To the best of our knowledge, ours seems to be
the first work to study the LMP mechanism in a game-
theoretic framework with strategic agents.
Our work differs from the literature on supply function
equilibria [9], [10], [11], [12] in two ways. First, we
take the underlying topology of the power network into
account including any capacity limits on the transmission
lines (which is precisely the reason LMPs are defined).
Moreover, power flows over the network in accordance
with the Kirchoff’s circuit laws, which makes the game-
theoretic anaysis of the network a lot more complicated
than for communication or transportation networks. Sec-
ondly, we adopt a general bid format while quadratic
forms are usually used in the study of supply function
equilibrium.
This paper is partly inspired by [13] which formally
established several “folk theorems” about the LMP
mechanism, and showed that many common assertions
(at that time) about it were factually incorrect. That
paper also suggests the need to understand the LMP
mechanism in a game-theoretic setting. Among the few
papers that study the strategic interaction in electricity
markets involving transmission lines, [14] is based on
a Cournot competition model, rather than the LMP
mechanism. It also focuses on the strategic behavior of
one agent only, assuming the environment at the other
nodes are competitive. The motivation of [15] is close to
our work but it focuses on the computational aspects of
solving the optimization problem, and does not address
the existence of Nash equilibria.
Our main results are the following: (i) Contrary to
“folk” assertions, we present counterexamples to show
that a Nash equilibrium may not even exist in the LMP
mechanism; (ii) When a Nash equilibrium exists, the
equilibrium outcome may be arbitrarily inefficient; (iii)
We provide two sufficient conditions (including one on
network topology) under either of which efficient Nash
equilibria exist; (iv) We propose a new mechanism,
called the Power Network Second Price (PNSP) mecha-
nism that always induces an efficient Nash equilibrium;
and (v) We consider extensions on the demand side in
which the demand can be elastic and/or strategic.
II. ECONOMIC DISPATCH AND THE LMP
MECHANISM
We first introduce the economic dispatch problem. The
concept of LMPs is based on the optimality conditions
for this problem.
A. The Economic Dispatch Problem
We assume a connected power network throughout the
paper, which consists of I nodes (or buses), indexed by
i = 1, . . . , I . A transmission line connecting node i and
j is characterized by its electrical admittance, denoted
Yij > 0. If there is no such line, Yij = 0. Note that
Yij = Yji.
Let Vi be the magnitude of the voltage at node i, and
θi be the phase angle. The real power flow over the line
from node i to j is given by
qij = ViVjYij sin(θi − θj),
which ignores reactive power and line losses. By our
sign convention, qij = −qji is positive if the power
flows from node i to j. Also, it is reasonable to as-
sume that Vi’s are approximately constant. Without loss
of generality, we can set Vi ≡ 1. Furthermore, due
to AC power flow, the economic dispatch problem is
typically a nonlinear program that is difficult to solve
in practice. Therefore, a DC flow model is often used
as an approximation [16], by assuming that the phase
angle differences |θi − θj | are small. Then we have
sin(θi − θj) ≈ (θi − θj) and
qij = Yij(θi − θj).
Let the capacity limit of line i-j be Cij = Cji > 0. So
we have
qij = Yij(θi − θj) ≤ Cij .
Assume there are N generators, indexed by n =
1, . . . , N . Denote the set of generators at node i by
Ni. The cost of each generator n is cn : R+ → R+
as a function of its generation xn, where cn(0) = 0,
c′n(xn) ≥ 0, and c′′n(xn) ≥ 0 (see Fig. 1). As for the
demand side, we assume inelastic demand Di ≥ 0 at
each node i. So the net power injected into the network
at node i is∑
n∈Ni
xn −Di =
∑
j
qij =
∑
j
Yij(θi − θj).
The economic dispatch problem is to determine the
optimal generation schedule that minimizes the total cost
subject to the transmission constraints. Formally, it is a
convex program with linear constraints:
min
xn,θi
∑
n
cn(xn) (1)
s.t.
∑
n∈Ni
xn −Di =
∑
j
Yij(θi − θj), ∀i, (2)
Yij(θi − θj) ≤ Cij , ∀(i, j), (3)
xn ≥ 0, ∀n, (4)
where (2) is the power balance equation, and (3) is the
line flow constraint. For a more complete model of the
economic dispatch problem (e.g., when line losses are
taken into account), the reader can refer to [17].
Note that the economic dispatch problem is based on a
given set of states of the generators, in comparison with
the unit commitment problem [5]; the N generators in
our consideration have been started up. The intercept
of the cost function is indeed a sunk cost, which does
not affect the optimal solution of the economic dispatch
problem. One will also see that it is irrelevant for
the optimal bidding strategies of the generators. This
explains why we can assume cn(0) = 0 (and later,
bn(0) = 0 for the bid curve) without loss of generality.
B. The LMP Mechanism
We now introduce how to determine the price at each
node, specified by the LMP mechanism. Associate the
Lagrange multipliers pii with (2) and µij ≥ 0 with (3).
The optimal solution of the economic dispatch problem
(1)-(4) is characterized by the following Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions:
[c′n(xn)− pii]xn = 0, ∀n ∈ Ni,
c′n(xn)− pii ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ Ni,∑
j
Yij(pii − pij + µij − µji) = 0, ∀i,
∑
n∈Ni
xn −Di −
∑
j
Yij(θi − θj) = 0, ∀i,
µij [Yij(θi − θj)− Cij ] = 0, ∀(i, j),
Yij(θi − θj)− Cij ≤ 0, ∀(i, j),
xn ≥ 0, ∀n.
The LMP at node i is defined as pii, the interpretation
of which is the cost of supplying the next increment of
load at that node. Intuitively, the higher the LMP, the
more difficult to deliver power to that node. The payoff
of generator n ∈ Ni is given by
un = piixn − cn(xn). (5)
The LMP mechanism is considered economically effi-
cient in the following sense: if the price at each node
i is fixed as pii, and each generator n chooses xn to
maximize his own payoff, then the resulting dispatch
is the economic dispatch. This can be seen from the
KKT conditions, which state that the marginal cost of a
generator with positive generation is exactly the LMP at
that node.
There are some counterintuitive facts about LMP, due
to Kirchhoff’s circuit laws (under DC approximation).
But this is outside the scope of this paper, and the reader
can refer to [13] for details.
III. GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
The LMP mechanism is based on the assumption
of a competitive environment, in which generators are
considered as price takers. In reality, however, generators
may have market power so that they may have an
incentive to not reveal their cost functions truthfully. In
that case, the economic dispatch problem is skewed and
the solution may not be optimal.
The main focus of this paper is to study the equilib-
rium outcomes under LMP when generators act strate-
O
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cn(xn)
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Fig. 1. The true cost curve cn(xn), the bid curve b0n(xn) in
practice, and the simplified bid curve bn(xn) determined by the three-
dimensional bid (pn, sn, qn).
gically. The first step is to reformulate the economic
dispatch problem as a game.
A. The Economic Dispatch Game
Recall that the cost function space is infinite-
dimensional. In the day-ahead market, each generator
is only allowed to report a function from a finite-
dimensional space as an approximation of his true cost
function. Such a reported cost function is called a bid.
We will specify the bid format in the next subsection.
We reformulate the economic dispatch problem as a
game, which we call the economic dispatch game (or
LMP game). Given a bid profile b = (b1, . . . , bN ),
the LMP mechanism determines the dispatch x =
(x1, . . . , xN ) as a solution of the following optimization
problem:
min
xn,θi
∑
n
bn(xn) (6)
s.t.
∑
n∈Ni
xn −Di =
∑
j
Yij(θi − θj), ∀i, (7)
Yij(θi − θj) ≤ Cij , ∀(i, j), (8)
xn ≥ 0, ∀n. (9)
Compared with the economic dispatch problem (1)-(4),
the only difference is that the true cost function c =
(c1, . . . , cN ) is replaced by the bid b. The LMP pi =
(pi1, . . . , piN ) is defined similarly, depending on b instead
of c. The payoff is the same as (5). This completes the
specification of the economic dispatch game.
We adopt the (pure) Nash equilibrium as the solution
concept. As usual, a Nash equilibrium is a bid profile
b with the associated outcome (x, pi), in which no
generator can be better off by a unilateral deviation. If x
also solves the economic dispatch problem (1)-(4), then
b is called an efficient Nash equilibrium.
Note that we stress the association between the bid
b and the outcome (x, pi), because the primal optimal
solution x as well as the dual optimal solution pi may not
be unique for a given b, especially for flow constrained
network and non-differentiable bids. This rarely happens
in practice, but does cause technical issues in equilibrium
analysis. For our purposes, we break ties for pi by
minimizing pii in the lexicographic order. That is, from
the set of the dual optimal solutions, we first choose
those with the minimum pi1, from which we then choose
those with the minimum pi2, and so forth.
B. Bid Format
In practice, the bid b0n of generator n is typically
a piecewise linear function with increasing slopes, as
shown in Fig. 1. According to the CAISO [18], for
example, “There are 10 bid segments and 11 associated
bid points. Each bid point has a generation (MW) and
price (PR) value, which are paired together as MW and
price coordinates.”
In this paper, we adopt a simplified bid format. Specif-
ically, the bid bn of generator n is determined by a three-
dimensional signal (pn, sn, qn), where 0 ≤ pn ≤ qn and
sn ≥ 0:
bn(xn) =
{
pnxn, xn ≤ sn,
qnxn + (pn − qn)sn, xn > sn.
This is illustrated in Fig. 1. Due to the correspondence,
such a signal will also be called a bid. Note that when
pn = qn, bn becomes a linear function so that the value
of sn does not matter.
The underlying rationale of the simplification is that
the (sub)gradient of b0n at the resulting xn contains the
key information to determine the outcome by convexity.
Given b0 = (b01, . . . , b0N ) with the resulting dispatch x,
if b0n is replaced by bn (specified by (pn, sn, qn)) where
sn = xn and pn (or qn) is the left (or right) derivative of
b0n at xn, then the resulting dispatch remains the same.
Clearly, pn < qn if xn is a breakpoint of b0n and pn = qn
otherwise.
Given the explicit bid format, we can restate the
economic dispatch game (6)-(9) as a linear program
(where xn := xpn + xqn):
min
x
p
n,x
q
n,θi
∑
n
(pnx
p
n + qnx
q
n)
s.t.
∑
n∈Ni
(xpn + x
q
n)−Di =
∑
j
Yij(θi − θj), ∀i,
Yij(θi − θj) ≤ Cij , ∀(i, j),
xpn ≤ sn, ∀n,
xpn, x
q
n ≥ 0, ∀n.
Such a three-dimensional bid is quite versatile. It will
also be used in the proposed Power Network Second
Price mechanism (see Section VI). Moreover, the idea of
dimensional reduction may be applied to a more general
underlying bid b0n, not necessarily a convex piecewise
linear function.
We should also note that quadratic bid curves
(as in supply function equilibrium literature) provide
smooth dispatch, revenue and profit curves that facili-
tate calculus-based analysis, while piecewise linear bid
curves (adopted by most ISOs) do not produce continu-
ously differentiable dispatch, revenue and profit curves,
requiring different analysis techniques [19]. This issue,
though, has little impact on our main results.
IV. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN THE LMP MECHANISM
In this section, we demonstrate the undesirable out-
comes under the LMP mechanism, due to the selfish
and strategic manipulation by generators. We present
counterexamples to show that a Nash equilibrium may
not exist in the economic dispatch game. Even when a
Nash equilibrium exists, the price of anarchy may be
arbitrarily large.
Non-Existence of Nash equilibria
Game-theoretic analysis for multidimensional action
space can be demanding in general. In the following
examples, we sometimes turn our attention from the bid
to the outcome (i.e., the dispatch and the LMPs), which
may facilitate the analysis.
Example 1. Consider the network as shown in Fig. 2.
The network has two nodes, with generator 1 at node 1
and generator 2 at node 2. The line capacity is C. The
only demand is D > C at node 2. The cost functions are
cn(xn) = anxn for all n with a1 < a2. So the efficient
economic dispatch is x∗ = (C,D − C).
1 2
C
x1 x2
D > C
Fig. 2. A two-node network for which no Nash equilibrium exists.
The LMP mechanism is used to do the dispatch and
the generators now act strategically. But there is no Nash
equilibrium in the corresponding game. This is because
it is guaranteed that x2 ≥ D−C and generator 2 is able
to make pi2 arbitrarily large by choosing p2 arbitrarily
large, so that his payoff is unbounded. To make it non-
trivial, we impose a bid constraint, say q1, q2 ≤ a (which
is a sufficiently large constant, interpreted as a reserve
price of the demand). We now prove the non-existence
by contradiction.
Suppose b is a Nash equilibrium with the associated
outcome (x, pi). First, it can be seen that a1 ≤ pi1 ≤ pi2
and a2 ≤ pi2. In fact, we have a2 ≤ pi1 = pi2; otherwise,
generator 1 has an incentive to increase pi1, so as to be
better off. Moreover, x1 = C; otherwise, generator 1 has
an incentive to deviate. Given x2 = D − C, there must
be pi2 = a and thus pi1 = a. But this cannot be a Nash
equilibrium, since generator 2 now can increase x2 by
making pi2 slightly smaller, so as to be better off. This
proves that there does not exist a Nash equilibrium.
The above example might seem concocted since there
is only one generator at the demand node, who knows
that at least D − C units of generation will have to be
purchased from him. But as the next example shows,
even if there is competition at the demand node, a Nash
equilibrium still may not exist.
Example 2. Consider the network as shown in Fig. 3.
The network has three nodes, with generator 1 at node
1, generator 2 at node 2, and generator 3 and 4 at node
3. The capacity of line 1-2 is C, and the capacity of line
2-3 is C′ > C. The only demand is D > C′ at node
3. The cost functions are cn(xn) = anxn for all n with
a1 < a2 < a3 < a4. So the efficient economic dispatch
is x∗ = (C,C′ − C,D − C′, 0).
1 2
3
C C′ > C
x1 x2
x3
x4
D > C′
Fig. 3. A three-node network for which no Nash equilibrium exists.
Suppose b is a Nash equilibrium with the associated
outcome (x, pi). First, it can be shown that a3 ≤ pi1 =
pi2 = pi3; otherwise, there must be some generator who
has an incentive to deviate. Moreover, generator 1 is
able to ensure x1 = C, and thus x2 = C′ −C. But this
cannot be a Nash equilibrium, since generator 2 now
can increase x2 by making pi2 slightly smaller, so as
to be better off. Therefore, there does not exist a Nash
equilibrium.
Price of Anarchy: There are also cases in which Nash
equilibria exist but some of them are undesirable in
terms of efficiency. The price of anarchy is a metric that
measures how the efficiency degrades due to the selfish
behavior of the players, compared with the socially
optimal outcome. It is defined as the ratio between the
cost of the worst equilibrium and the socially optimal
cost:
PoA =
maxx
∑
n cn(xn)∑
n cn(x
∗
n)
,
where x∗ is the economic dispatch that solves (1)-(4),
and x is the resulting dispatch associated with any
Nash equilibrium. The following example shows that the
price of anarchy in the economic dispatch game can be
arbitrarily large.
Example 3. Consider the network as shown in Fig. 4.
The network has two nodes, with generator 1 and 4
at node 1, and generator 2 and 3 at node 2. The line
capacity is C. The only demand is D = 2C at node
1. The cost functions are c1(x1) = x1, c2(x2) = kx2,
c3(x3) = kx3, and c4(x4) = 2kx4, where k > 1 is a
parameter subject to change. So the efficient economic
dispatch is x∗ = (2C, 0, 0, 0).
1 2
C
x1
x4
D = 2C
x2
x3
Fig. 4. A two-node network for which the price of anarchy can be
arbitrarily large.
Consider the bid profile, (pn, sn, qn) for each n, where
p1 = p4 = 2k, p2 = p3 = k and qn = pn (so that
sn does not matter), with the associated outcome x =
(C,C, 0, 0) and pi = (2k, k). It is easy to check that it
is a Nash equilibrium. For example, generator 1 has no
incentive to make pi1 = k (so that x1 = 2C) since his
new payoff, (k−1)2C, would be smaller than his current
payoff, (2k−1)C. Thus, the price of anarchy is bounded
below by (since there may exist other equilibria that are
even worse)
c1(C) + c2(C)
c1(2C)
=
C + kC
2C
=
k + 1
2
→∞,
as k → ∞. Therefore, the price of anarchy can be
arbitrarily large.
V. EFFICIENT NE: SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
On the other hand, LMP works well in most cases.
While the price of anarchy is unsatisfactory, the price
of stability (defined as the ratio between the cost of the
best equilibrium and the socially optimal cost) can still
be good, which is equal to 1 when an efficient Nash
equilibrium (NE) exists. In this section, we present two
sufficient conditions under either of which there exist
efficient Nash equilibria.
Unless otherwise specified, we make the following
assumption which ensures that no generator has market
power to ask for arbitrarily high prices.
Assumption 1. The feasible dispatch set remains non-
empty if any one of the generators is excluded.
Our first condition is the following.
Assumption 2 (Congestion-Free Condition). No line
flow constraint (3) is binding in the economic dispatch
problem (1)-(4).
The following lemma shows the uniformity of LMPs
in the economic dispatch problem under this condition.
Lemma 1. Under the congestion-free condition, all the
LMPs are equal in the economic dispatch problem.
Proof: Let I be the set of nodes with the largest
LMPs, i.e., argmaxi pii. Under the congestion-free con-
dition, µij = 0 for all (i, j). From the KKT conditions,
we have ∑
j
Yij(pii − pij) = 0, ∀i.
Then for each i ∈ I and j connected to i (i.e., Yij > 0),
since pij ≤ pii, we must have pij = pii, or j ∈ I. It
follows by the connectedness of the network that all the
nodes belong to I. Therefore, all the pii’s are equal.
It is immediate to prove by construction the existence
of efficient Nash equilibria in the economic dispatch
game, under the congestion-free condition (which is
defined for the economic dispatch problem).
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1 and the congestion-
free condition, there exists an efficient Nash equilibrium
in the LMP game.
Proof: Let x∗ be an economic dispatch that solves
(1)-(4), with the associated LMP pi∗, where pi∗i = pi∗1 for
all i (by Lemma 1). Consider the bid profile, (pn, sn, qn)
for each n, where pn = qn = pi∗1 for n ∈ Ni (so that
sn does not matter), with the associated outcome x =
x∗ and pi = pi∗. It remains to show that it is a Nash
equilibrium.
Consider generator n. From the KKT conditions, we
have x∗n ∈ argmaxx pi∗1x− cn(x). His current payoff is
un = pi
∗
1x
∗
n−cn(x
∗
n). Suppose he changes his bid so that
the resulting outcome is (x˜, p˜i). Under Assumption 1 and
given the others’ bids, we have p˜ii ≤ pi∗1 . The payoff of
generator n will be
u˜n = p˜iix˜n − cn(x˜n)
≤ pi∗1 x˜n − cn(x˜n)
≤ pi∗1x
∗
n − cn(x
∗
n)
= un.
Thus, he has no incentive to deviate. This proves that
the constructed bid profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Since there is no Nash equilibrium in Example 1 and
2, the congestion-free condition cannot be satisfied in
either of them (which is indeed true).
Our second condition is a condition on the network
topology, and its satisfaction is easy to determine.
Assumption 3 (Monopoly-Free Condition). There are
at least two generators at each node.
Note that under the monopoly-free condition, As-
sumption 1 is automatically satisfied. The monopoly-
free condition is more natural than the congestion-free
condition, since we only need to know the placement of
the generators in the network; we do not even need to
know the line capacity limits, nor the cost functions of
the generators. The proof of the existence of efficient
Nash equilibria under the monopoly-free condition is
similar as before.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1 and the monopoly-
free condition, there exists an efficient Nash equilibrium
in the LMP game.
Proof: Let x∗ be an economic dispatch that solves
(1)-(4), with the associated LMP pi∗. Consider the bid
profile, (pn, sn, qn) for each n, where pn = qn = pi∗i for
n ∈ Ni (so that sn does not matter), with the associated
outcome x = x∗ and pi = pi∗. It remains to show that it
is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider generator n ∈ Ni. From the KKT conditions,
we have x∗n ∈ argmaxx pi∗i x − cn(x). His current
payoff is un = pi∗i x∗n − cn(x∗n). Suppose he changes
his bid so that the resulting outcome is (x˜, p˜i). Under
the monopoly-free condition and given the others’ bids,
we have p˜ii ≤ pi∗i . The payoff of generator n will be
u˜n = p˜iix˜n − cn(x˜n)
≤ pi∗i x˜n − cn(x˜n)
≤ pi∗i x
∗
n − cn(x
∗
n)
= un.
Thus, he has no incentive to deviate. This proves that
the constructed bid profile is a Nash equilibrium.
In Example 3, pn = qn = 1 (and sn arbitrary) for
all n, with the associated outcome x = (2C, 0, 0, 0) and
pi = (1, 1), is such an efficient Nash equilibrium.
Although neither of the two conditions is necessary for
a Nash equilibrium to exist (which can be easily shown),
they are mild enough to cover most practical scenarios.
In that sense, we justify the fact that the LMP mechanism
is widely adopted and works well most of the time. In
other words, we can say that the best equilibrium in the
economic dispatch game is socially optimal except in
rare cases.
VI. THE POWER NETWORK SECOND PRICE
MECHANISM FOR ELECTRICITY MARKETS
Since the LMP mechanism does not always induce
the desired outcome, we seek alternative mechanisms.
In this section, we propose the Power Network Second
Price (PNSP) market mechanism that always induces an
efficient Nash equilibrium.
The proposed mechanism is a VCG-type mechanism.
Note that the standard VCG mechanism does not apply
directly, because we require a finite-dimensional (and
preferably low-dimensional) bid space while the type
space is infinite-dimensional.
In the PNSP mechanism, we still adopt the three-
dimensional bid (pn, sn, qn) for generator n. The dis-
patch rule remains the same, given by the optimization
problem (6)-(9). The key difference is the payment rule
(or pricing rule), as specified below.
Let x−n0 = (x−n01 , . . . , x
−n0
N ) denote the solution
when generator n0 is excluded (so that x−n0n0 = 0). Note
that we need Assumption 1 to ensure that the definition is
meaningful. The payment made to generator n0 is given
by
wn0 =
∑
n6=n0
bn(x
−n0
n )−
∑
n6=n0
bn(xn), (10)
which is the positive externality that generator n0 im-
poses on the other players by his participation. Then,
his payoff is
un0 = wn0 − cn0(xn0). (11)
This completes the specification of the PNSP mecha-
nism.
We show that the PNSP mechanism always induces
an efficient Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 1, there exists an effi-
cient Nash equilibrium in the PNSP mechanism specified
by (6)-(11).
Proof: Let x∗ be an economic dispatch that solves
(1)-(4). Consider the bid profile, (pn, sn, qn) for each n,
where pn = c′n(x∗n), sn = x∗n and qn > pn. It is easy to
check that x∗ also solves (6)-(9) under this bid profile.
It remains to show that it is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider generator n0. His current payoff is
un0 =
∑
n6=n0
bn(x
−n0
n )−
∑
n6=n0
bn(x
∗
n)− cn0(x
∗
n0
).
Suppose he changes his bid, resulting in a new dispatch
x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜N ), with x˜−n0 = (x˜−n01 , . . . , x˜
−n0
N )
defined similarly as before. Then his payoff will be
u˜n0 =
∑
n6=n0
bn(x˜
−n0
n )−
∑
n6=n0
bn(x˜n)− cn0(x˜n0 ).
So his payoff changes by
u˜n0 − un0
=
∑
n6=n0
bn(x
∗
n)−
∑
n6=n0
bn(x˜n) + cn0(x
∗
n0
)− cn0(x˜n0)
(12)
≤
∑
n6=n0
pn(x
∗
n − x˜n) + cn0(x
∗
n0
)− cn0(x˜n0 ) (13)
=
∑
n6=n0
c′n(x
∗
n)(x
∗
n − x˜n) + cn0(x
∗
n0
)− cn0(x˜n0)
≤ c′n0(x
∗
n0
)(x˜n0 − x
∗
n0
) + cn0(x
∗
n0
)− cn0(x˜n0 ) (14)
≤ 0. (15)
Equation (12) follows since x−n0 = x˜−n0 . Equation (13)
follows from the fact that bn(x∗n) = pnx∗n and bn(x˜n) ≥
pnx˜n. Since x∗ minimizes the convex objective function
c(x) =
∑
n cn(xn) over a convex set P (determined by
(2)-(4)), we have
∇c(x∗) · (x− x∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ P.
In particular, letting x = x˜, we get∑
n
c′n(x
∗
n)(x˜n − x
∗
n) ≥ 0,
from which (14) follows. Equation (15) follows from the
property of convexity.
Thus, he has no incentive to deviate. This proves that
the constructed bid profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Like the LMP mechanism, there may also be undesir-
able Nash equilibria in the PNSP mechanism.
VII. EXTENSIONS ON THE DEMAND SIDE
In the modeling of the demand side, we need to
consider two factors:
1) Elastic or inelastic demand. The demand is inelas-
tic if it is a constant; it is elastic when modeled as
a valuation function.
2) Strategic or non-strategic demand. The demand
is non-strategic if the reserve price (for inelastic
demand) or the valuation function (for elastic
demand) is known; otherwise, it is strategic, in
which case the consumers report (not necessarily
truthfully) such private information as in a double-
sided auction.
Thus, there are four combinations of modeling the
demand side. We have assumed so far that the demand
at each node is inelastic and non-strategic. Due to space
constraints, we illustrate the modeling for elastic and
strategic demand.
Based on the single-sided economic dispatch problem
(1)-(4), we now assume there are M consumers, indexed
by m = 1, . . . ,M . Denote the set of consumers at
node i by Mi. The valuation of each consumer m is
vm : R+ → R+ as a function of its consumption ym,
where vm(0) = 0, v′m(xm) ≥ 0, and v′′m(xm) ≤ 0. We
obtain the double-sided economic dispatch problem in
the following:
max
xn,ym,θi
∑
m
vm(ym)−
∑
n
cn(xn)
s.t.
∑
n∈Ni
xn −
∑
m∈Mi
ym =
∑
j
Yij(θi − θj), ∀i,
Yij(θi − θj) ≤ Cij , ∀(i, j),
xn, ym ≥ 0, ∀n, ∀m.
The LMP and the payoff are defined similarly as before.
We can also define the double-sided economic dis-
patch game and ask each consumer to report a three-
dimensional bid as an approximation of his true valuation
function. We note that all the main results in this paper
have their counterparts for the double-sided setting. The
reader can refer to [20] for our previous work, in
which elastic and strategic demand is considered (with
a slightly different bid format).
VIII. CONCLUSION
We provided a framework for studying strategic inter-
actions in economic dispatch via the LMP mechanism.
We showed that contrary to folklore, a Nash equilibrium
may not exist in the LMP market mechanism. And even
when a NE exists, the price of anarchy may be arbitrarily
large. What these results mean in practice is a very
important question worthy of further investigation since
wholesale electricity markets where the LMP mechanism
is used seemingly work well. But the spot markets
apparently do not. Perhaps the lack of an equilibrium
in the wholesale market introduces instabilities in the
spot market that wouldn’t be there otherwise—we can
only speculate!
We have also shown that under two sufficient condi-
tions (no congestion in the economic dispatch problem,
or when there are at least two players at each node),
an efficient Nash equilibrium does exist. Our findings
coincide with the policy proposed in [2]: ensure enough
competition in wholesale markets.
We also proposed a new market mechanism that
always induces an efficient Nash equilibrium. In the
double-sided setting, the mechanism can incur a budget
deficit. Thus, further work is needed to tackle these
difficult issues.
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